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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PRINCF~-COVEY & COMPANY, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaint if f-Rcs pondent,
vs.

Case No.

12964

JJDRRY V. STRAND,
Def cndant-Appclla11 t.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Prince-Covey & Company, Inc.
NATURE OF THE

CASl~

Respondent, tht• plaintiff bdo\1', hrought a contract
action for damages sustained by it when Appellant failed
to pay for sPcurities ordered by h!m and 1•11rchased
for his account h~r Respondent.

DISPOSl TION IN THl~ L(}WER COFR'I'
A nonjury trial was held in the District Court of
thP 1'hi rd Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County,
the llonornble D. Frank Wilkins presiding. The Trial
('omt granted to Plaintiff-Respondent Judgment in the
amount of $3-1-,696.16. The Trial Court determined that
1fospondent had suffered damages in the amount of
$37,4:15.84 based upon the difference between the amount
1

which Respondent had paid for securities acquired at
Appellant's request and for his account, and the amount
Respondent realized from the sale of these securities
(without deduction of commissions) when Appellant failed to pay for them. From this total damage figure, the
Trial Court deducted the sum of $6,430 representing
damages suffered by Appellant when Respondent, without Appellant's consent, sold fully paid-for S<'curitil'~
from AppPllant 's account. The damage of $6,430 represented the difference between the fair market value
of the converted secmities, as found by the Trial
Court, within .a reasonable period of time after the date
of conversion, and the actual amount realized by Respondent from the sale of such stock and credited to Appellant's ae:count. To the resulting total judgment in the
sum of $31,005.84, the Trial Court added costs and interest at the rate of 6% per annum from May 14, 1970, in
the amount of $3,690.32.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court reversing
the award of damages to Appellant or, in the alternative,
modifying the amount of damages awarded to .Appellant by virtue of the conversion of Appellant's
fully paid securities. In all other respects, Respondent requests that this Court affirm the judgment
of the Trial Court.
STATEMENT OF FAC'l1S
Respoudent, a Utah corpora tlon, is a licensed broker·
dPaler which buys and sells securities through interstate
2

('ummerce (Record, pp. 13:>-3G). Sometimes in late 1969
'
Appellant opened a special cash account with RespondPnt (Rel'ord, p. 136). Appellant placed orders with
Respondent for the purchase and sales of various secnritiPs and Respondent executed such orders until Mav 18
. '
1970 (I~xhibits 1-P and 2-D, and Record, pp. 136, 201
and 239.)
Appellant's account was intially handled in such
a way as to require payment, pursuant to· Federal Regulations, within seven business days of the date of purchati1~ (Record, p. 139). In April of 1970, Appellant
indicated to Respondent's agent, Keith Sudbury, that he
would like to have future purchase transactions effected
with the understanding that payment would be made on
dE'livery of the stock certificates ( Record, pp. 140 and
141). Pursuant to this request, Respondent so treated
purchase transactions after April 10, 1970 (Recorded,
p. 144).
Between the dates of April 10, 1970 and 1\fay 18,
1970, the Appellant gave to Respondent various orders
for thl" purchase of securities for Appellant's account
with tlw understanding that payment would be made
on delivery of the stock certificates (Record, p. 144).
Within 24 hours after each such transaction Respondent
t;ent to Appellant at an address furnished by Appellant
a written confirmation of the transaction by U. S. Mail,
postage prepaid, and as the securities purchased arrived
RPspond,mt specifically identified them as belonging to
ApJH'llant by placing said securities in a special folder
(Reeord, p. 223). At no time did Appellant send to
3

Respondent a written objedion to the contents of am
of the aforesaid confirmations (Record, pp. 222 and 23:-l).
At all times prior to ~Iay 15, 1970, Appellant
promptly paid for securitit's as the same were received
by Respondent and delivered (Record, pp. 1-1:2 and HJ).
On or about May 15, 1970, securities purchased by RPspondent for Appellant's account pursuant to Appc•J.
lant's instructions were received by Respondent, arnl
Appellant, having been notified of this fact, deliven'd
to Respondent a check in the amount of $16,095 (Record,
pp. 145, 199 and 234). On or about May 19, 1970, Respondent was notified by its bank that Appellant's check
had failed to clear his bank because of insufficient fnncl~
(RPcord, p. 199).
(h ~Iay 19, 1970, Respondent began liquidation of
the trmrnactions by selling the securities for which
Appellant had not paid when delivery was kndered
(Reconl, p. 145). Then~after, as promptly as possible,
Res1Jondent liquidated each transaction in Appellant'o
aC('Otmt hy selling the securities in an attempt to reduce
tlw nnpairl halance of this account (Record, pp. 145 and
1-!7). As of May 18, 1970, the debit balance in Appf'llant's aceoant was $100,702.8-! (Record, pp. 201 and 202).
From ::\Ia;,- 18 to .Tmw 18, 1970, Respondent realized the
sum of ~;63,267.00 without deduction of commissions,
throngh liqnidation of the Apywllant's aeconnt 10aving n
ha1nnce of $37,-+35.~-t (H('f'(ffd, p. 203.)
1

iMr. David Nelson testified that tl~e :;iccount was reducedir:o
$40 542 58 but the Trial Court reduced this figure by $3,106:74 re] d
senting. commissions earned by Respondent upon the sales mvolve ·
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l!l(·]ucled in Aprwllant's account were certain securitiPs for which Appellant had paid but which were still
being held by Responcl<>nt (Record, p. 233). Despite
testimony by Respondent's agent to the effect that these
st>curities were held as security for the faithful performance by AppPllant of the credit arrangements (Record,
p. 18:3), the '!'rial Court fou11c1 that these securities
were conYertrd \\"hen the same were sold by Respon(1Pnt. The amounts realized therefrom were credited
to Appllant's account (RPcord, p. 78). Appellant testified that the fair market value of said stocks within two
1n•eks from the commencement of the liquidation was
$16,980 (Record, p. 235). Offsetting this claim, Re:-;pond<>nt, punmant to Appellant's instructions, sold
$5,2-l:O worth of these securities and puid Appellant this
amount, lc•ss commissions of $152.50, in rash on l\Iay 18,
1070. (Record, p. 242), In addition, as the remaining portion of these stocks were liquidated, Respondent credited
Appellant's account with amounts realized totalling
$6,221 (Record, p. 129 and Exhibit 7-P).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENT PROVED BY A PREPONDERANCE
OF THE EVIDENCE THE EXISTENCE OF AN
AGREEMENT BETWEEN IT AND APPELLANT,
AND THE BREACH THEREOF.

'l'hPre can he no question that Appellant had an
ac·count for the purchase and sale of securities at Respondent's brokerage house. Appellant admits this fact
on page 35 of his brief. The crux of Appdlant's argu5

ment in Point I of his brief appears to be that a com.
prehensive understanding as to how the account would
be handled if the customer fails to pay is an indispens
able part of any contract for the sale or purchase of
securities and the absence of such an understandin11t
renders the contract incomplete and void. In addition,
Appellant appears to be arguing that regardless of the
merit of the foregoing proposition, Respondent had no
authority to handle the account in the manner in which
it was handled. The record contains persuasive evidence
supporting the Trial Court's conclusions on both of
these points.
'l'he absmdiiy of the first proposition is obvious.
The entire contract involved in the instant r...a.se wa1
that Respondent would purchase securities in a~ord
ance with Appellant's orders and Appellant would pay
for them. Appellant admitted in paragraph 2 of the
Second Def ens(' of his Answer, and has never taken a
position to the contrary, that he ordered securities and
that he failed to pay for them when payment became
due (Rerord, p. 54).
The case of Gregory-Massari, Inc. v. Purkitt. 82
Cal Rptr. :210, 1 Cal App. 3rd 968 (1969), involved a
similar failure on the part of the customer to pay for
securities he had ordered. The defendant there argued
that tlw contract involved an understanding as to h011
the account would he handled in the event of a failun
to pay. The California Court of Appeals, in holding for
the hroker, said:
6

"In our case the entire contract was that
plaintiff would sell stock to defendants and defendants would pay for it. Performance of the
agreement required no other action by either
party. Liquidation of thP debt in the event of
defendant's default was no part of the agreement.
Plaintiff did not agree to sell the stock after
seven days, or at all. Its duty in that respect was
imposed by the regulation.... " Supra, p. 216.
The answer to Appellant's second proposition is
equally clear although it will involve more explanation.
Section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C:. ~~ 78a, et seq., prohibits securities brokers and
dealers from extending credit to any customer in contravention of rules and regulations prescribed by the
Board of Governors of the Federal ResPrVP System. 2
Regulation T, 12 C.F.R., ~ 220.1, et seq., was pronrnlgated by the Federal Reserve System's Board of Governors pursuant to § 7 and provides, in pertinent part of
§ 4 thereof, as follows:
" ( c) Special cash account.-( 1) In a special
cash account, a creditor may effect for or with
any customer bona fide cash transactions in securities in which the creditor may:
(i) Purchase any security for, or sell
any security to, any customer, provided,
funds sufficient for the purpose are already
held in the account or the purchase or sale
is in reliance upon an agreement accepted by
the creditor in good faith that the customer
will promptly make full cash payment for
the security and that the cust01_ner do.es not
contemplate selling the secunty prior to
making such payment.
452.

215 U.S.C. § 78g, as amended July 29, 1968, PL. 90-437, 82 Stat.
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(2) In case a customer purchases a security
(other than an exempted security) in the special
cash account and does not make full cash payment
for the security within 7 days after the date on
which the security is so purchased, the creditor
shall, except as provided in subparagraphs (3)(7) of this paragraph, promptly cancel or otherwise liquidate the transaction or the unsettled
portion thereof.
(5) If the creditor, acting in good faith in
accordance with subparagraph (1) of this paragraph, purchases a security for a customer, or
sells a security to a customer, with the understanding that he is to deliver the security
promptly to the customer, and the full cash payment to be made promptly by the customer is t0
be made against such delivery, the creditor 11m
at his option treat the transaction as one to which
the period applicable under subparagraph (2)
of this paragraph is not the 7 days therein specified hut ;35 clays after the date of such purchase
or sale.
( 7) The 7-day periods specified in this paragraph refer to 7 full business clays. The 35-day
period . . . refers to calender days, but if the last
day of a11y such period is a Saturday, Sunday, or
holiday, such period shall be considered to end
on the next full business day. For the purposes
of this paragraph, a creditor may, at his option,
ilisreo-ard
any
a
. sum due by the customer not exceeding $100." (Emphasis added)

Seclion :~ of tl1e Ht•gulatiou, 12 C.F.R. § 220.:3(a),
requires all finan<'i al r<'la ti ons hehn'Pn a. hrnker nn:l
its custonwr to lw handled in a ''g<'neral a('connt'' with
the exception of t11ose transactions s1wcifieally authorized to he hand!Pd in one or more "special acc01mt:-:"
8

provich·d for in ~ 4. Special account transa0tions must
Jw conducted in strict compliance with the terms and
<'onditions set forth in~ 4 or a violation of Regulation T
oc·nirs. It is conceded hy Appellant that all transactions
between Respondent and Appellant were handled in
n spe('ial cash account. Brief for Appellant, Staten!l'11t of Facts, p. 5; Record, p. 136. Section 4(a) (2)
stat<·s that, "Each ... special account shall be recorded
sPp~uatPly and shall be confined to the transactions
and rdations specifically authorized for such account .
. . ." Appellant's account at Respondent's brokerage
homw was re>ceiwd into evidence as Exhibit 1-P. Reeord,
p. 172.
Tlw "cash account" (technically termed the "special
eash account") described in the Regulation is one in
which the customer is extended credit ·where transactions
are pffoctPd with the understanding that they will be
settl<'cl vromptly. 220.4(c) (1) (i), supra, p. 7. The
meaning of the word "promptly" is that these transactions will hP sP'ttlPd within the two or threP days reqnir<>d hy use of th<> usual transmittal fa<'ilities. See
Jl<'llloran<lnm of the Board of (foyernors, 12 C.F.R. Reg.
:2:20.+ ( <'). Tn any event, full cash paymrnt must he made
within 7 days afte>r the date of purchase>.
Tlic're: is an exception in the special cash account proYision:-; of RPgulation T pursuant to which, if a purchase
if' madP by a customer with the understanding that
payrnPnt is to be made on delivery, the broker/dealer
ma~'. ot his ovtion and acting in good faith, treat the
transaction as onP in which the applicable period of

time for payment is not 7 full husiness davs
but u.i•)·
•
calendar clays.§ 220.4(c)(5) and (7), snpra, p. 7. In
such a purchase transaction, the hroker/dPaler has thi·
obligation to deliver and obtain payment as soon a1
possible but since a purchased security might not Jw
delivered to the broker within a 7-day period, the period
within which delivery must be made to the customer
and payment must be macle to the hroker is extended to
not more than 35 days. Upon request of Appellant, and
in light of his excellent record of payment for securitiri
purchased (Record, p. 142) and because of the size of
his account (Record, pp. 138 and 139), he was infonned
on or about April 10, 1970 that future transactions in
his account could be paid for upon delivery to him by
Respondent of the securities purchased, or on a C.0.D.
basis (Record, p. 156). For the period from then until
l\Iay 15, 1970, Appellant complied with the C.O.D.
arrangement (Record, p. 144), and paid promptly upon
delivery of the purchased securities. (Record, pp. 143
and 144).

It should be noted that the 7-day maximum payment
period undPr Regulation T is applicable to all transac·
tions except those where the broker elects to treat the
transacton as one to which the applicable period is 35
davs and that the broker can only extend credit (whether
up to 7 or up to 35 days) if the broker in good faith
believes that the customer will promptly make full cash
payment l1pon delivery. § 220.4(c) (5), supra, p. 7.
This "O"ood
faith" rPquirement is for the purpose . of
b
prohibiting an extension of crPdit in any transaction
where the broker-dealPr knows the customer may not

fo;
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he able to pay. In short, the broker is prohibited from
effecting any fnrther purchases for a customer who the
broker, iu good faith, does not believe can pay, and additionally the broker is prohibited from continuing to
extend credit with regard to previous purchases for
which payment has not been made. The broker must
recPiw payment immediately or he must promptly cancel
or otherwise liquidate the transaction or transactions.

In Matter of Naftalin d'; Company, Inc., CCH Feel.
See. L. Hep. 92,995 (8th Cir., Nov. 29, 1972, certain
broker/dealer creditors of a bankrupt broker/dealer
(N aftalin) appealed from a district court decision holding that these creditors had violated Regulation T and
directing the bankruptcy Referee to ddenuine ,.,-hat
these creditors' claims would have amounted to if the
transactions with Naftalin had been liquidated in compliance with the Regulation. Naftalin had special cash
accounts with some 27 broker/dealers and for some period of time had been selling stocks to these dealers for
his own account. Although the Regulation prohibits sales
for a customer in a specia1 cash account where the
('Ustorner does not own the security at the time the
order is placed, N aftalin's usual practice was to place
orders for the sale of securities which he did not own
hut looked to purchase at a lower price in the future.
Over a pE>riod of time preceding the transaction in question, N af talin had been very slow in making deliveries
but he had always given plausible excuses for the delays
and had always represented to the other dealers that
he did, in fact, own the securities and that the reasons
for delay had to do with transfer agents, other brokers
11

failing to deliver N aftalin's securities to him, or other
reasons of this nature.
In August of 1969 N aftalin placed orders for sales
of securities in excess of $10,000,000 and when the prices
of the securities went up by over $1,000,000 he finalh
confessed that he did not own the securities and could
not make delivery. During the weeks between the sales
and the confession, brokers inquired as to when they
could expect delivery, and N aftalin met these inquirities
with typically evasive and misleading replies. After the
confession, the brokers bought-in the undelivered stocks
at an aggregate cost in excess of $1,285,000. The total
loss claimed was the difference between this purchase
price and the original price of the undelivered securities.
or $653,000.
Xaftalin claimed that the failure of these creditors
to comply with section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act
made the short-selling scheme possible and that they
should therefore be prohibited from enforcing their contracts. The first violation alleged by N aftalin was that
the brokers could not "in good faith'' have believed that
the securities sold would be "promptly" delivered in
light of N aftalin's past performance. The district court
decision, rejecting this contention on the grounds that
the brokers could well have believed that Naftalin owned
the securities despite his slow deliveries, was affirmed.
N aftal;n's second argument was that the brokers should
have promptly liquidated the transactions by repurchasing the sold securities when N aftalin did not deliver
in 7 days. While the court did not entirely agree with

12

Xaftalin's position,' it did hold that each transaction
involwd should have been liquidated at such time as the
broker involvt'<l no loHger had a good faith assurance
that the securities sold would be promptly delivered.
The court stated that, ""We think the broker/dealer is
under a continwing obligation to maintain a good faith
assurancP that the sak transaction is, in fact, a bona fide
t'ash transaction and that the securities sold will be
promptly delivered." id. at 93,001. (Emphasis added).
The transactions in the instant case must be divided
into two categories: namely, the transactions for which
cleliwry to Appellant \Vas made on May 15, and for
\\'hich AppPllant was unable to pay and secondly, those
pmcliase transadions made prior ro :\lay 19, fw cfatP
upon which Respondent was notifo·d of th<' had check,
arnl rPlative to ·which the securitle::i purchased had not
~-et lwen received. Respondent was cornpdlPcl to promptly
liquidate all securities in the first cafrgor.1· h<~cac!SP
prompt liquidation is required by tlw clear arnl umnistakahle language of Reg.~ 220.4(c)(5).
With respect to the securities in the second category,
the plain meaning of subsection ( 5) and the holding of
tlw Safta1i11 case, supra, p. 11, is that the broker may only
Pxtend credit until the time of delivery in tho·se cases
when" thE' brokE'r in good faith believes that the customer
\\"ill promptly make full cash payment upon such deliv<>r:-·. 'J'hns, aftE'r May 19, 1970, Respondent could no
longPr extend crt>dit on the securities in the second cateasection 220.4(c) (2) of the Regulati_on c~ntains ~specific liquidation requirement for purc~as~ tr~nsacho~s _m special cash acco_unts
but there is no equivalent hqmdat10n prov1s1on for sales transactions.

13

gory because Respondent was now aware of Appellant's
obvious inability to pay.
In N aftalin, the same rules had to be a pp lied.
The difference, of course, \ms that in Na/tali n the cu~
tomer had not promptly delivered securities while in the
instant case the customer failed to promptly deliver
payment for securities. The rule in both cases is that
at the time the broker can no longer believe, in good
faith, that tlie crnstomer is going to perform promptly,
the broker must liquidate the transaction. In Naftalin
the court stated:
"The good faith of a broker/dealer who has
originally executed a sell order in compliance
with Regulaton T must gradually dissipate a~
time passes without delivery of the securities ...
If no credible explanation for the delay is forthcoming, the transaction must be bought-in immediately." Id. at 93,002.
ThP difficult task in the Naftalin case was to determine the point in time when the creditors were required to take affirmative action. rrhere is no difficulty
in determining this time in the instant case because the
minute ~\ppellant's check bounced, Respondent knew
Appellant could not pay for the purchases involved or
for any other purchases he had theretofore made.
Appellant argues that RespondPnt's capital positi'on
mav have heen "precarious'' and that Respondent eleetetl
to ."sav<> its mm hide by sacrificing the defendant.''
Brief for Appdlant, pp. 17 and 18. It is irrdevant
whetlier or not the Respondent's capital position was
14

precarious m that a failure to liquidate the account
would have violated Regulation T and would have subjected Respondent to disciplinary proceedings. In the
Matter of John W. Yeaman, Inc. and John, W. Yeaman,
SF}C Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-7527 (Feb.
10, 1965), the SEC held that the failure of a broker to
fa1uidate customer's purchases on a special cash account
when full payments were not made within 7 days after
tlu~ execution of the transactions violated Regulation T.
'l'be Commission stated that it was no excuse for the
violation that the purchasers were good credit risks.
See also Maryland Securities Co. Inc. and Morton
Sandler, 40 SEC 443 (1960).
For the same reason, there was no requin•ment that
R(•spondent give nofice to Appellant or that any "reasonable, good faith effort" be made hy lle:-;pondent to e~'fl'ct
recovery on the check. Similarly, tlwrP \ms no reqnireHH'nt that Respondent obtain Appellant's com;Pnt to the
liquidation of the various transactions. Appellant's reliance upon these argnnients indicates a lack of under~tandin bo· of the mandatorv
nature of Regulation
T in
.
n•qniring prompt liquidation of th<> transaction.
Appellant eontt•nds that then• was no testimony or
l'YidPnc'P tliat any stock had h(•t-n delivered to him. The
'l'rinl Conrt fonnd in Finding of Fact No. 10 that "on
l\I ay 14, 1970, securities purchasPd by plaintiff for defendant's account pursuant to defendant's instructions
WPre received by plaintiff, and defendant, having been
notified of this fact, delivered to plaintiff a check in the
amount of $16,095'' (Record, p. 77). The securities re-
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ceived on that date were "delivered'' within the rneaninrr
of the Uniform Commercial Code, ~ 70A-8-313,
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, when Respondent,
upon purchase, sent to Appellant confirmation of the
purchase and when, on May 14, 1970, Respondent identified a specific security in Respondent's possession as
belonging to Appellant (Record, p. 223). As to securities received after the above date, plaintiff's Exhibit P-1
indicates the days upon which deliveries of all stock
certificates were made by virtue of the receipt of the
same by Respondent and the placing of the same in the
spe·cial folder maintained for all of Appellant's purchases and sales.

Utah

Appellant attempts to attach some significance to
tl:e fact that Respondent did not introduce into evidencr
Pach individud confirmation regarding each purchase
ancl sak• in A11pellant's account. However, as Appellant
adrnits (Brief for Appellant, pp. 20 .and 21), it is apparent that Respondent could have provided confirmations
on Pvery transaction since Respondent files its confirmations numerically by transaction number and Respondent's computer run (Exhibit P-1) lists each transaction by the transaction number. In addition, the
computer run contains all the information contained on
the confirmation slips. Compare Exhibit P-1 with Exhibit P-5.
Appellant contends that the reason it was necessary
for Respondent to provide all of the confirmations i~
that § 4(a) (2), supra, p. 4, requires that each special
account must be recorded separately. An examination of
plaintiff's Exhibit P-1 indicates that each transactiou
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wat> rPcorded t>eparately. However, even if thit> were not
the cat>e it is difficult to understand the thrnst of Appellant's argument. If that argument is that Responde11t violated Regulation T, the answer is that such a
Yiolatiou would not bar Respondent's recovery in this
matter. In E. F. Hutton & Co. v. Weinberg, 151 NYLJ
No. 40, p. 16, (1964), the New York Supreme Court
affirmed the granting of a summary judgment in
favor of a stockbroker in its action against a customer on a note signed by the customer to cover
<leficicncie" in the customer's account. The customer alleged that the note was unenforceable since the
underlying transactions were in violation of the Regulation T requirements. The court ruled that the facts, if
true, of the broker's violation of the Regulation T requirements were not sufficient to bar the broker's
recovery from the customer.
In addition, the violation alleged by Appellant results from Appellant's m~sconception as to the meaning
of a "special account." The Regulation provides for a
number of special accounts included among which are a
special cash account, a special omnibus account, a special
arbitrage account, and a special commodity account.
The meaning of the provision cited by Appellant is that
a brokPr may not record transactions relative to a special
arbitrage account in the same records as the broker
l'Pcords transactions relative to the special omnibus
account. However, all transactions falling within one
R<'connt are to bt> recorded in the same place. The fact
is that all transactions handled by Respondent for Appellant were transactions in the special cash account and
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therefore were requireJ to be ncorded in the same place.
There is no provision in the special cash account regulatious reqniriug recordation of a C.O.D. transaction
(§ 220.4(c)(5), supra, p. 8), to be made in a different set
of books from the recorda ti on of a 7-day transaction
(§ 220.4(c) (2), supra, p. 8)
There is a similar lack of relevance in Appellant's
argument that part of Appellant's large debit balanc('
was dne to 2,000 shares of Agan which were improperly
included in Appellant's account. The transactions involving the Appellant's bad che-ck were not liquidated
because of a large debit balance. They were liquidated
hecanse of a failure to promptly pay for securities purchased, upon delivery, pursuant to the terms of the
special cash account rules regarding these transactions.
Appellant's aecount was debited each time he purchased
securities but, nntil May 19, 1970, Appellant was not
obligated to pay for any such purchases until Respondent had recPived the stock certificates from the seller.
(Brief for Appellant, p. 208). From the foregoing discussion it should be clear that Respondent not only had
the authority to handle Appellant's acC'ount in the manner it was handled, it had the affirmative obligation to
so handle it.
POINT II
THE LIQUIDATION OF ALL APPELLANT'S PU R C H A S E TRANSACTIONS
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF REGULATION T DID NOT RESULT IN A CONVERSION OF APPELLANT'S PROPERTY.
Appellant advances a novel theory in Point II of
his brief. The initial argument contained therein is that
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Appellant had no obligation to pay for securities purchased until there was an actual delivery of stock certificates. Appellant thereby confuses the extension of
credit with a contract obligation to pay for securities
purc·l1m.;ed. The contract between Appellant and ReqwndPnt was that Respondent would purchase securities
in aceordance with Appellant's orders and that Appellant would pay for them. Supra, p. 6. Appellant admitt(•cl in the third defense of his Answer that ht> orderecl
securities from RE'spondent and that he failed to pay
for them when payment became due.
From the foregoing invalid proposition and based
npo11 the 'Trial Court's findings of liability, Appellant
c-oncludPs that there must haYe bren an actual or constructive ddiwry of the stock to the Appellant and that
it follows that Appellant was the legal owner thereof.
Apparently the argument is that Appellant became the
legal owner of the purchased securities at the time the
conl'innations wPre sent, notwithstanding the fact that
Appellant never paid for these securities. Finally,
..-'qi1wllant argues that these sPcurities "o·wned" by him,
but never paid for by him, were "eonvcrted" by the Respond<·nt and that this conversion resulted in damages
to Appellant.
Appellant's theory that securities for which he failed
to pay were "converted" by Respondent upon liquidation of the transaeti ons i 1ffolved i:s not supported by a
single ('m;p or statute. 'I'o the contrary, there are a great
1mrnlH·r of ('ases \Yhere a broker who has liquidnted an
aeC'()llllt bas snf'd for arn1 rccoYerecl from his customer
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damages baspd on the d.ilference between the valuP the
customer agreed to pay [or the securities and the amount
i'L'<:dize<l upon liquidation. In effect, Regulation T, in
order to control the extension of credit by broker/dealen
iu the securities market, creates a security interest
in the securities purchased for a customer's account and
compels the broker/dealer to foreclose upon this interest
by cancelling or liquidating the transaction if payment
is not promptly made or if the broker/ dealer, acting in
good faith, can no longer extend credit.
In Gregory-llf assari, Inc. v. Purkitt, supra, p. 6, a
registered hroh:er /dealt~!' sued for damages for breacl1
of contract. The dealer accepted an order from the defendants and sent them a confirmation of the sale. 'l'lw
confirmation eontained a payment elate in compliance
"'ith Regulation T. Failing to receive payments, the
broker sold the securities several months later' at a
loss and brought an action to recover damages based on
the difference between the amount realized on sale and
the original purchase price. The court stated that the
contract was enterPd into so that thP broker/dealer
would purchase securities for the defendants and tTw
defendants would pay for them. Based upon this contract, the court held that the plaintiff had stated a cause
of action for damages. Accord. Nichols & Co. v. Col11111lnts Credit Corp., 126 N.Y.S. 2d 715 (Sup. Ct. 1953) and
Irving Weis & Co. v. Offenbrrger, 220 N.Y.S. 2d 1001
(Mun. Ct. 1961).
"In Gregory-Massari the custo_me~ raised a defens'; bas_ed upon
the broker's failure to "promptly" hqmdate the_ transac~10ns mbol~~;
The court allowed an offset based upo:r:i tJ:te higher pnce the
this
could have obtained had he promptly hqmd~ted. No defende _o f ct
nature has been raised by Appellant in the mstant case an , m d~ni
the main thrust of Appellant's arguments seems to be that Respon
was too prompt in its liquidations.

f
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If Appellant were to prevail on his theory, a broker/
<kaler liquidating one or more transactions as required
by Regulation T would always be guilty of a conversion.
Regulation T would necessarily be invalid for constitutional reasons, and the entire purpose of the Regulation,
which is to prohibit excessive credit in the stock market,
would be thwarted.

Even if the Court were to find that these securities
were converted, these damages claimed by Appellant
were nevu· proven and must be computed on the basis
of values set forth in paragraph 4 of Appellant's counterclaim. 5 The per share values set forth on page 27
of Ap1)ellant's brief were never offered into evidence.
Further, if: appears from the testimony that Appellant
arrived at his figures on value by asking various brokers
for the value figures. Respondent believes that its hearsay objections, overruled by the Trial Court, to this testimony on vnlue was well taken. Infra, pp. 22-25.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF $6,430
DAMAGE TO APPELLANT ON HIS COUNTERCLAIM IS EXCESSIVE.
In his counterclaim, Appellant alleged that certain
shares of stock for which he had paid in full were in the
pol'session of Respondent as of the time Appellant's
ac-connt was liquidated. Appellant further alleges and
daims that said fully paid shares of stock were sold by
'Appellant testified that the total value ?f 5 different securities
for which he had fully paid but which were bemg held by Ri:spondent
was $16, 980. Record, p. 235. He did not, however, testify as to
values of individual securities.
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Respondent without Appellant's consent and without
authority and that such sales constituted a conversion
by the Respondent of Appellant's stock resulting in
damages to Appellant in the amount of $16,605 (Record,
p. 65). By his testimony, Appellant revised this figure
to $16,980 (Record, p. 235). On page 30 of his brief,
Appellant attempts to revi·se the figure again to the
sum of $17,980 by virtue of adding the "individual figures pertaining to the stocks in question.'' However,
Appellant never introduced individual value figures pertaining to the stocks into evidence and certainly cannot
be allowed to introduce them on appeal. This Appellant
attempts to do on page 27 of his brief by copying values
per share of selected stocks from paragraph 4 of the
First Cause of Action in his counterclaim. Because of
the lack of individual stock prices, the only testimony in
evidence is tha.t the fair market value of the fully paid
stock converted by Appellant was $16,980 (Record, p.
235).
Although Appellant testifiNl that the total value of
the securitiPs owned by him and 80ld by Respondent
was $16,980, this evidence should ha \·e been excluded
by the Trial Court by reason of the fact that it was
improperly admitted over Appellant's hearsay objection.
In the cross examination of Appellant, the following
questions by Respondent's counsel and answers by
Appellant took place:
(Q) Now, Mr. Strand, you claim a total value

of some $16,000 is that correcH

(A) That is correct.
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( Q) And that total value is determined how 1
(A) By the representative prices that these
stocks traded at within about a two-week
period.

( Q) Where did you get the sales

prices~

(A) From representative brokers on actual transactions, on actual trades.
Mr. Prince: I object , then, to the whole testimony with regard to the price because I
object to it as hearsay
Mr Faber: Your Honor, he can't object at this
time. He has been querying the witness for
20 minutes now. Now, he wants to object
to it.
Mr. Prince: That's the first time I found out
where he got them.
The court : Overruled.
(Record, pp. 243 and 244)
An examination of the record will indicate that it
was n<Yt true that Respondent's counsel had been "querying the witness for 20 minutes" prior to the hearsay
objection. To the contrary, the above testimony was the
first time Mr. Strand had disclosed the manner in which
he determined stock prices. It is the general rule that
heanmy Pvidence is incompetent and inadmissible to
establish a fact. 2.9 Am. Jitr. 2nd 551 (Evid. § 493).
lfrarRay is defined as testimony in court of a statement
made out of court, such statement being offered as an
assrrtion to show the truth of matters asserted therein.
and thus n~sting for its value upon the credibility of
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the out-of-court asserter. McCormick, Handuook of tlir
Law of Evidence, Hornuook Series, page 4GO (1954).
Thus, hearsay is evidence which derives its value not
solely from the credit to be given to the witness on the
stand but in part from the veracity and competency
of some other person. 29 Am. J1tr. 2nd 551 (Evid. ~ J93'i.
·while the hearsay rnle is subject to a large number
of exceptions, the hrn underlying reasons for any exception to the rule are the necessity for the exception and
the circumstantial guarantees of the trustworthiness of
the offered evidence. Matthews v. United States, 217 F.2d
409, 417 (5th Cir., 1954). Neither of the tests were met
in this case. If Appellant had wished to establish stock
prices during the period of time following his bounced
check, he could have easily introduced expert testimony
to accomplish thi's. Thus, there is no necessity for the
application of an exception to the rule. In addtiion, the
fact that Appellant did nO't testify as to any specific
trades, by offering confirmations of actual sales or an
expert, casts grave doubts upon the trnstworthisnrss of
the offered evidence. Finally, it was obviously in Re·
spondent's best interests to realize as much as possibl1
from sales of the converted securities. The fact that
Respondent could only realize the amounts set forth on
Exhibit 7-P is the best evidence of the actual fair market
Yalue of the securities as of that time.
Later, during voir dire examination by his counsel,
Appellant testified that sales from which he determined
the price of stock were sales from his account at respond·
ent 's brokerage house (Record, p. 250). Subsequently,
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Appellant testified that these were sales from his account at Parker-Mawood (Record, p. 251). Even assuming this were true, however, wherever the sales figures
may have come from they are still subject to the same
hearsay objection because they were apparently relayed
to Appellant from "representative brokers" who -...vere
not called as witnesses in this case.
Assuming this court affirms the Trial Court's rulmg on the hearsay objection, Appellant still has over-

stated the damages he sustained. In paragraph 7 of
the First Cause of Action of Appellant's Counterclaim,
Appellant concedes that the foregoing figure should be
n•duced by the sum of $5,087.50 by reason of sales of
stock and corresponding cash disbursements made by
Respondent to Appellant (Record, p. 65). Respondent
has no quarrel with this position. These cash disbursements were made before Respondent knew that Appellant's check had bounced and were, therefore, normal
transactions in the account. Commissions totaling
$152.50 were properly charged on thes(~ transactions.
By consulting Exhibit 1-P it can be seen that the $5,087
paid to Appellant represented sales of the following
shares of stock on the following date:
Gross

5-18-70
3-18-70
5-18-70
5-18-70

Commission

Net

2,000 Investestate $ 240.00 $ 15.00 $ 225.00
562.50
37.50
600.00
5,000 Inwstestate
37.50 1,612.50
300 Agan Mines 1,650.00
2,687.50
62.50
500 Agan Mirn~s 2,750.00
$5,240.00
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$152.50 $5,087.50

Since the $5,087,50 was disbursed to Appellant against
the sales of the above stocks (Record, p. 65) the above
shares of stock must be subtracted from the number of
shares actually converted by Respondent. It, therefore,
appears that the following securities were found to be
converted by the Trial Court:
Cl ass1c
. M:"
. ------------------------ 27 ,500 shares
· rnrng
Investestate ---------------------------- 23,000 shares
Stansbury -------------------------------- 4,000 shares
King Oil ------------------------. ________ 2,000 shares

By subtracting the $5,240, representing cash delivered to Appellant plus commissions charged on the sales,
from the total value claimed by the Appellant, the evi.
dence will support a finding that Respondent converted
$11,740 worth of stock. By consulting Exhibit 7-P, it
can be detennined that Appellant, upon the sale of
this stock, gave Respondent credit in his account at the
following values :

=
Investestate 23,000 shares at 6.3 cents per share =
Classic

27,500 shares at 131/s cents per share

$3,652
1,449

Stansubury

4,000 shares at 7112 cents per share

=

1,449

King Oil

2,000 shares at

=

820

41 cents per share

$6,221
Counsel for Appellant stipulated that the foregoing
prices were the prices Respondent received upon the
sales of the various securities (Record, p. 129). Appellant testified that in his total damage figure he had not
subtracted the credit given to his account by virtue of
the sale of these stocks (Record, p. 259).
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'l'he Trial Court, in paragraph 7 of its Conclusions
of Law (Record, p. 79) found that Respondent did not
haw the right to sell these fully paid securities and,
therefore, held that the Appellant was entitled to damages for their conversion (Record, p. 79). rrhe proper
computation of these damages would be to subtract from
the $11, 740 (representing the value of the converted
securities) the $6,221 credit given to Appellant on his
account. The maximum damage figure which can, therefore, be awarded to Appellant on his counterclaim is
$5,519.
The incorrect figure of $6,430 awarded to Appellant
by the Trial Judge arose by virtue of the fact that Appellant's attorney stated that the total amount Appellant
was seeking was the sum of $11,517 .50 (Record 265).
From this amount claimed by Appellant's counsel, the
trial judge subtracted the offset of $5,087.50 conceded
by Appellant in paragraph 7 of the First Cause of Action
of his counterclaim (Record, p. 65). While this figure is
supportable on the record because of the inaccurate
claim made by Appellant'·s counsel ,it does not represent
the actual damages for the conversion, and this court
should, therefore, reverse and hold that Appellant is
entitled to no damages on his counterclaim by reason
of the improper admission of hearsay evidence. Alternatively, this court should hold that the damage figure
tihonld be revised to $5,519, the only figure supportable
hy the Pvidence.
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POINT IV
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS SHOULD NOT
BE INVOKED TO PRECLUDE RECOVERY
IN THIS CASE.
Appellant's arguuwnt that the contracts for the
purchase of securities involved in this ease are unenforce.
able by reason of the statute of frauds can be disposed
of by a close examination of Uniform Commercial Code
§ 70A-8-319, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
This section contains the statute of frauds rules re]a.
tivP to the sale of sPcurities. Although Respondent need
fit only one of thE> four exceptions therein contained in
order to avoid application of the statute, it is interesting
to note that Respondent can satisfy each of the exception provisions.
The first exceptiou is where there is some writing
signed by the party against whom enforcement is sough!
or by his authorized agent or broker sufficient to indi·
cate that a contract has been made for sale of a stated
quantity of dPscrihE>d st>curities at a defined or stated
price. Respondent acted a::; the authorized broker for
Appellant. Findings of Fact numbers -t, 5 and 6 (Record,
pp. 76, 77 ). Respondent introduced as Exhibit 4-P its
form confirmation slip and introduced testimony to the
effect that such a confirmation slip was mailed to the
selling broker by U.S. :J[ail, postage prepaid, within
24 hours after each purchase shown on Exhibit 1-P.
Exhibit 4-P indicates that a contract ha:s been made
and states the quantity of securities, describes the same
and states the price. There is no question but what the
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writing was signed by the broker in that ~ /OA-1-201
definPs the word "signed" a:s including any symbol executed or adopted by a party with present intention to
authentic·ate a writing.
Similarly, subsection (b) is satisfied in the instant
ease by reason of the fact that delivery of the securities
was, in Pach case, accepted by Appellant. Under subsection ( 1) (a) of § /OA-8-313, delivery to a purchaser
occurs when he or a J!erson de.-;ignated by him acquires
pos:-:;ession of a security or under subsection (c) when
his hroker sends him confirmation of the purchase and
also hy hook entry or otherwise identifies a specific
s<'eurity in the broker's possession as belonging to the
pun·haser. Acceptance must be presumed by virtue of
the fact that Appellant did not object, in writing, to any
confirmations (Record, pp. 222 and 223) as required
hy § 70A-8-319(c).
---- If the foregoing were not sufficient ,an analysis of
.,;uhparagraphs ( c) and ( d) should leave no doubt as to
the inapplicability of the statute of frauds. In Findings
of Fact numbers 6, 7 and 8, (Record, p. 77) the Trial
Court found that between the dates of April 10, 1970 and
May 18, 1970 the Appellant gave to Respondent various
onl!'rs for the purchase and sale of securities for Appellant's aef'onnt and that Respondent executed said orders
in af'cordauce with Appellant's instructions. The Court
found that within 24 hours after each such transaction
Rl'spomlPnt sent to Appellant a written confirmation of
the 1-'Ul<· or purchase and as the securities purchased
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arriwd Respondent specifically identified them as bi
longing to Appellant by placing the securities in a specia
folder. Finally, the Trial Court found that at no ti 111,
did Appellant send to Respondent a written objection ti
tlw contents of any of the aforesaid confirmations. Tit,
conclusion1:J reached by the Trial Court are amply sup
ported by the testimony of David E. Nelson, an officrr
and member of the Board of Directors of Responden:
and a principal of Respondent. Record 221-223. 6 Thm
subparagraph ( c) of ~ 70A-8-319 is satisfied.
The final exception to the statute of frauds rul·
is eontained in subparagraph ( d) and occurs where th,
party against whom enforcement is sought admits in !fr
pleadings, testimony or otherwise in court that a con
tract was made for sale of a stated quantity of describe,
securities at a defined or stated price. In paragraph:
of the First Cause of Action of Appellant's Counter
claim, (Record, p. 64) Appellant states that:
"From the fall of 1969 through June 1970, th1
defendant had a special cash account with thi
plaintiff corporation, Account No. 01-182048-009.'
Upon the introduction of Exhibit 1-P, Appellant's coun
sel, when asked the nature of the exhibit stated:
6Appellant appears to be claiming that by introducing each of tl 1
confirmations for the individual transactions Respondent would ha 1·,
been able to prove their receipt by Appellant. However, even hau
these confirmations been produced, Respondent could not have thereb~
proved receipt thereof by Appellant. That these confirmations wen
received by Appellant is clear from .Mr. Nelson's tes~im~ny that the:
were mailed to him by U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, m the usua,
course of business (Record, p. 222) and by the fact that AppellaJi
received all of the monthly statements, summarizing each of the trani
actions, which he introduced into evidence as his Exhibit D-2.
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"Its [sic] a computer run of the defendant's
acco~nt at Prince-Covey, a partial computer run.
1 thmk maybe the beginning part of it isn't
there." Record, p. 172.
Exhibit 1-P contains each transaction involved in
Appellant's account, and includes the stated quantities
of described securities at defined or stated prices. Furtlwr, Appellant admits in paragraph 2 of his second
defense to "having a special cash account with the plaintiff. . . . The defendant admits that the plaintiff did
extent him credit in Salt Lakr County, State of Utah,
in connection with the purchase of certain securities."
Record, p. 5:1. Finally, the second paragraph of Appellant's third defense in Appellant's Answer states:
"Defendant admits ordering securities from the
plaintiff, admits failure to pay for the securities
when payment became due.... " Record, p. 54.
In paragraph 3 of the same defense, Appellant
includes the following admission: "Defendant admits
having made orders for the purchase of securities .... "
Record, p. 54. From the admissions contained in the
pleadings and in the testimony, it must be concluded
that Appellant has admitted contracts for the purchase
of stated quantities of described securities at stated
prices.
CONCLUSION
Appellant has laboriously reargued the facts of
this ease und seeks reversal on that basis. He makes
little <'i'fort to argue the la''' as evidenced by the
la(·k of authorities cited in his brief. Thr Findings of
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Fact made by the Trial Court are all supportable lw
the evidence and so canot be said to be clearly erroneou~.
Respondent respectfully submits that the judgrnern
of the Trial Court should be affirmed in all respect
except for the $6,430 damages awarded to Appellant or1
its counterclaim alleging conversion of certain of Appel
lant's securities. 'With respect to the Appellant's counter
claim, this Court should hold that Appellant is entitleo
to no damages by reason of the improper admission ol
hearsay evidence and, therefore, judgment should h1
entered for Respondent for $37,435.84 plus interest fro111
May 14, 1970 and costs. Alternatively, this Court shouhl
hold that the damage figure of Appellant's counterclaim
should be revised to $5,519.00 and, therefore, judgment
should be entered for Respondent for $31,916.84 plm
interest from May 14, 1970, and costs.
Respectfully submitted,

PRINCE, YEATES, WARD,
MILLER & GELDZAHLER
Frederick S. Prince, Jr.
D. Jay Gamble
Attorneys for Respondent
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Received two copies of this RESPONDENT'S
BRIEF this -------- day of January, 1973.

KENNETH RIGTRUP, ESQ.
466 East Fifth South
Suite 101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
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